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Abstract — Security concerns of safety-critical systems increase 
due to interconnections of systems. This paper tries to outline 
future security requirements in avionics and issues in assessing 
the reliability of software from the safety and security 
perspective. Quantitative work on software reliability has focused 
on requirements-to-code translation; software security has 
focused more on requirements correctness. Future work must 
take advantage of results from both the security and safety areas.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Security is becoming a major concern of aircraft manufacturers 
as airplane connectivity is increasing to new levels. Connectivity 
off-board comprises passenger connectivity, automatic content re-
freshes (maps, entertainment systems), and maintenance activities 
in addition to traditional control tasks (e.g. for air traffic manage-
ment). Security also concerns onboard systems and their separation 
and information flow. ARINC811 describes aircraft operations and 
maintenance considering security aspects [6]. Figure 1 depicts air-
craft network security domains, major aircraft system, and access 
properties (closed, private, and public) and users of domains.  
 
Figure 1.  Onboard aircraft network domains (ARINC-811 [6]) 
Future aircraft architectures aim to increase connectivity 
between domains and ground services. With this, security concerns 
increase as described exemplary in [1][2] and system development 
requires architectural elements ensuring security, such as secure 
information flow using gateways [3]. A major goal of security is to 
ensure the safety of the passengers and crew, with confidentiality 
taking lower priority. Hence, aircraft IT security is best described 
as “security for safety” [7]. 
Secure architectures are only one element to achieve secure 
operations. In addition, aircraft operators need to use security 
processes, evaluating and monitoring risks and vulnerabilities and 
considering (new) threats to critical assets [1] [6]. The 
implementation of the architecture also has primary importance in 
determining security. E.g. “the effectiveness of a security 
countermeasure is its ability to reduce the occurrence of successful 
attack and is the combined result of the strength of mechanism and 
the implementation assurance, as classified by the security level of 
the system or item.“ (p.22 [5]) Assurance of the implementation is 
thus as important to security as the architecture itself.  
The aerospace sector has developed strong assurance processes 
to ensure safe implementation, such as DO-178/ED-12 [8] for 
software and DO-254/ED-80 [9] for hardware. A major question 
now is to what extent these processes are also effective in 
achieving security. We aim at collecting (ideally quantitative) 
evidence from existing safety-related and security-related 
processes and reason about if and how indicators of effectiveness 
of safety-related processes and methods are useful predictors for 
their effects on security in aircrafts. For example, whether despite 
the benign threat models often applied in the safety domain, the 
software engineering that removes safety-critical implementation 
defects also removes security vulnerabilities. 
II. SAFETY AND EMERGING SECURITY STANDARDS IN 
AEROSPACE 
A. Safety 
Figure 2 shows the safety-related development assurance 
process in aerospace. ARP 4754 [11] gives guidance for system 
level development to fulfill legal requirements of safety (like FAR 
25.1309 for transport category aircraft). It defines steps for 
adequate refinement and implementation of requirements.  ARP 
4761 [12] describes adequate safety assessment during this refine-
ment, via techniques like FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Ana-
lysis), FTA (Fault Tree Analysis), Functional Hazard Assessment 
(FHA), (Preliminary) System Safety Assessment ((P)SSA), and 
Common Cause Analysis (CCA). Besides ground and flight tests, 
analysis including engineering analysis, stress analysis, system 
modelling and similarity modelling contribute to ensure safety.  
 
Figure 2.  Overview of Safety-Related Development Assurance in Aerospace 
For software, DO-178 describes the process to transform requi-
rements to code, assuming the requirements (input) as correct. 
Techniques used to ensure correctness are independent reviews, 
traceability, robustness tests, etc. It should be noted, however, that 
the code is only as correct as the requirements.  Esposito and 
others provide an overview of major safety standards [10]. 
B. Security 
Security processes for IT are emerging in aerospace. ED202 
[5] provides guidance to developers and certification authorities 
for aviation systems that can be adversely affected by human 
interactions and can eventually impact the aircraft’s safety 
properties. For this purpose, the standard establishes a relationship 
between the impact of a threat scenario, the threat scenario’s 
likelihood, and the final risk-acceptance value for the aircraft 
system. If the likelihood of a threat scenario is too high to be 
acceptable, either the threat scenario’s likelihood or its impact 
must be decreased to meet safety requirements.  
The Common Criteria [13] also apply in aerospace, e.g. by 
using separation kernel protection profiles for embedded operating 
systems in aerospace such as the work of the Open Group on 
compositional approaches to security and MILS Common criteria 
focus on ensuring correctness of requirements and system 
architectures. Heitmeyer and others describe an example 
applicable to aerospace in [17].  
III. DISCUSSION  
While there is research on the effectiveness of software 
engineering techniques, quantitative results based on field data are 
rare. Software processes in aerospace concentrate on correctly 
translating requirements to code and less on the verifying the 
correctness of the code itself, although there is considerable work 
on abstract interpretation and showing the absence of certain forms 
of run-time exceptions.  
Safety is a system property, but available work on process 
evaluation is focused mainly on the software process. Among 
reports on field data, German describes a major technique, 
software static code analysis, and its effectiveness [15]. An 
anomaly discovery rate of 1 in 1000 lines is not uncommon 
(though does not mean that this has a direct safety effect), however 
we are more concerned with judging possible defects left in the 
code, not those removed. Data on effectiveness of static analysis 
and other software engineering techniques in industrial application 
are sparse. In addition, there is evidence that the discovery rate of 
vulnerabilities is closely related to the effort spent on seeking them 
and in some common products there is an effectively infinite pool 
of vulnerabilities.  Some techniques are available for estimation of 
residual errors in safety-critical software, such as Bloomfield and 
Guerra present in [16]. However the extension of this work to link 
process to achieved security-related software reliability is a major 
challenge given the dynamics of the threat environment. 
Carter summarizes a workshop on safety-critical versus 
security-critical software [14] describing that techniques for 
determining safety and security requirements are essentially the 
same. The security domain would benefit from using software 
development techniques from the safety domain but cost and time-
scale implications may be a barrier. 
In software security, the focus is often split between adapting 
to addressing recent vulnerability patches and overall correctness 
of the software requirements. However, a major need is to assess 
the translation of software requirements to code. 
The authors are members of the SeSaMo collaborative project 
(http://sesamo-project.eu), addressing the combined assessment of 
safety and security in embedded systems. An important component 
of the problem in aerospace is to collect evidence on the effective-
ness of safety-driven processes, and security work based on Com-
mon Criteria evaluations, ideally including composite certification 
aspects [4] and to develop models to allow us to understand and 
judge deployed systems. This is enormously ambitious but given 
the threat reality something that is urgently needed. Any modeling 
and associated evidence must take into account both the challenges 
of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties.   
A major question is to assess (ideally quantitatively) how 
effectively existing safety-oriented processes are performing from 
the viewpoint of security and how effective (new) security 
informed processes might be. Given the relatively strong 
performance of safety-oriented software processes in require-
ments-to-code translation, and in requirements checking (modeling 
of software requirements to ensure correctness), the question 
remains whether safety-related processes for translation also are 
effective in preserving security properties.  
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